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ABSTRACT
One area of particular concern for computer forensics examiners involves
situations in which someone utilized software applications to destroy evidence.
There are products available in the marketplace that are relatively inexpensive and
advertised as being able to destroy targeted portions of data stored within a
computer system. This study was undertaken to analyze a subset of these tools in
order to identify trace evidence, if any, left behind on disk media after executing
these applications. We evaluated five Windows 7 compatible software products
whose advertised features include the ability for users to wipe targeted files,
folders, or evidence of selected activities. We conducted a series of experiments
that involved executing each application on systems with identical data, and we
then analyzed the results and compared the before and after images for each
application. We identified information for each application that is beneficial to
forensics examiners when faced with similar situations. This paper describes our
application selection process, our application evaluation methodology, and our
findings, including the variability of the effects of these tools. Following this, we
describe limitations of this study and suggest areas of additional research that will
benefit the study of digital forensics.
1. INTRODUCTION
Arguably, one of the most difficult challenges facing computer forensics
examiners concerns identifying evidence from digital data in situations where
someone has deliberately attempted to destroy information. This challenge is
compounded by conflicting perspectives, as individuals that hire computer
forensics examiners seem to anticipate that professionals within this field are able
to retrieve all relevant evidence, individuals that wipe data do so with the intent
that their techniques are sufficiently elaborate enough to prevent information from
being recovered, and forensic examiners may be driven by professional pride and
the satisfaction of performing their craft well in order to uncover evidence wiped
by sophisticated methods. These conflicting goals between those that attempt to
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hide evidence and those that seek to submit recovered evidence within the legal
system increase the levels of risk and uncertainty facing computer forensics
examiners in situations where attempts to destroy data have occurred.
One area of particular concern for computer forensics examiners involves
situations in which someone utilized software utilities or applications designed
specifically to destroy evidence (R-Tools Technology, 2011). There are a number
of products available in the marketplace that are easily available, relatively
inexpensive, and advertised as being tools to destroy targeted portions of data
stored within a computer system (Hughes, Coughlin, & Commins, 2009). This
study was undertaken to identify these tools and analyze them. Our analysis goals
focus on identifying trace evidence, if any, left behind on suspect disk media after
executing these applications (O & O Software, GmbH, 2011). We found two
examples of prior literature that addressed this topic; however, both of them are
based on older versions of Windows operating systems. The earlier work
evaluated “disk cleaners” on Windows 98 and Windows 2000 based systems
(Jones & Meyler, 2004). More recently, a paper discussed “disk scrubbers” on
Windows XP based systems, and Jones and Meyler (Geiger, 2006).
We evaluated five Windows 7 compatible software application products whose
advertised features include the ability for users to wipe targeted files, folders, or
evidence of selected activities (i.e., Internet history, registry keys, etc.)
(KremlinEncrypt.com, 2008). Rather than select tools that simply wipe entire
storage devices, we chose to evaluate tools that target portions of storage media,
as the potential exists to recover data from partially wiped media, especially if the
wiping application performed poorly or left trace evidence (Paragon Technologies
GmbH, 2011).
After selecting five file wiping applications, we conducted a series of experiments
that involved executing each application on systems with identical data. We then
analyzed the results and compared the before and after images for each
application. While the extent of wiping data differs among the applications, we
identified information concerning each application that is beneficial to forensics
examiners when faced with obtaining evidence from systems subjected to similar
situations.
The following sections describe our application selection process, our application
evaluation methodology, and our findings. Following this, we describe limitations
of this study and suggest areas of additional research that will benefit the study of
digital forensics.
2. APPLICATION SELECTION
The data wiping software products on the market can be divided into two broad
categories: those that simply wipe an entire volume or device and those that allow
users to target selected files, folders, or data related to certain activities (e.g.,
Internet history or server log files). The software utilities or applications we chose
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to evaluate are those that allow users to wipe targeted files or folders within a
specified volume or device, as this set of products provide the potential for
suspects to intentionally attempt to conceal their activities while maintaining a
useable system. Our objective was to identify trace evidence available on known
systems in which the selected applications have been utilized.
In addition to the ability to select specific files or folders within a volume, we
chose to focus on the Windows 7 operating system. Our justification for this is
that Windows is the most widely used family of operating systems and, at the
time of this study, Windows 7 is the most recent version available. Although large
numbers of Windows XP and Windows Vista installations are currently in use,
Windows 7 is likely to be more widely used as time moves forward.
Table 1 - Initial data wiping applications
Product

File/Folder Target
Wiping

Windows 7
Compatible

Acronis Drive Cleanser

No

No

Active@KillDisk

Yes

Yes

Bodrag Wipe Expert 2

Yes

No

Darik’s Boot and Nuke

No

No

Data Wiper Tool

Yes

No

Heidi Eraser

Yes

Yes

Evidence Eliminator

Yes

Yes

Evidence Smart

Yes

Yes

HDDerase

No

No

Iolo DriveScrubber

Yes

Yes

Jetico BCWipe

Yes

Yes

Kremlin Wipe

No

No

O&O Safe Erase

Yes

Yes

Paragon Disk Wiper
Personal

No

Yes

R-Wipe & Clean

Yes

Yes

UltraSentry

Yes

Yes

Webroot Window Washer

Yes

Yes

Active@Eraser

Yes

Yes
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Our selection process began in March, 2011, by selecting a team of senior,
undergraduate Computer Information Systems students at California State
Polytechnic University (Cal Poly Pomona) that had successfully completed
coursework in Computer Forensics. After describing our objectives to the team of
students, we asked them to perform research to identify the data wiping
applications that met our criteria. The student team was instructed to use the
Internet as a research tool to approximate the procedures we believed typical
suspects were likely to follow to learn of these tools. As a result, the student team
identified a set of eighteen applications, as listed in Table 1 (EvidenceSmart.com,
2011) (GEEP EDS LLC., 2011) .
We reviewed each of the products identified in Table 1 - Initial data wiping
applications using criteria including purchase price, the availability of a fullyfunctional trial version, customizability, reporting capability, security standards,
targeted file/folder wiping, registry wiping, device wiping, partition or volume
wiping, graphical user interface (GUI), and logging capability(Acronis Inc, 2011)
(Bodrag S.R.L., 2011). We then selected five products for comprehensive
analysis from the list, with each of the products meeting our minimum
requirements and collectively providing an extensive range of features.
Additionally, the five selected data wiping tools ranged in purchase price from
free to the most expensive product identified. The products selected for analysis
are listed in Table 2 - Selected data wiping applications.
Table 2 - Selected data wiping applications
Product

Version

Purchase
Price

File/Folder
Wiping

GUI

Heidi Eraser

6.0.8

Free

Yes

Yes

Evidence
Eliminator

6.0.3

$149.95

Yes

Yes

Jetico BCWipe

5.01.2

$39.95

Yes

Yes

Active@Eraser

4.1.0.5

$29.95

Yes

Yes

Webroot Window
Washer

6.6.1.18

$29.95

Yes

Yes

We limited our evaluation to five applications, as we had determined that this was
the maximum number of applications we could feasibly test extensively given our
limited resources and time constraints. We also felt that this was an adequate
number of applications to test, as this was intended as a demonstration of
capability rather than an exhaustive study. Each of the selected applications
utilized a GUI, as we reasoned that non-technical individuals were more likely to
use them instead of command-line products. Finally, all selected applications
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allowed targeted file and folder wiping, and they operated on the Windows 7
operating system. A summary of the features of each of these applications is
described below:
2.1 Heidi Eraser
Eraser, distributed by Heidi Computers, Ltd., is a freely available data wiping
application that is released under the GNU General Public License, including its
source code (Heidi Computers, Ltd., 2010). This tool’s features include the ability
to remove selected files and folders, support for all Windows compatible drives,
and use of a customized scheduler (Low, 2010). Additionally, the version of
Eraser used in this study (v6.0.8) operates on Windows XP and all existing,
subsequent versions of the Windows operating system.
2.2 Evidence Eliminator
Evidence Eliminator is a data wiping application that can, ostensibly, target a
large array of files that can be wiped and hidden from forensics analysis. Among
the specific items that can targeted for elimination in the test version are swap
files, application logs, temporary files, the Recycle Bin, registry backups, Internet
Explorer (IE) temporary typed Uniform Resource Locators (URLs), cache and
history files, AutoComplete forms and passwords, cookies, and slack space
(Robin Hood Software Ltd., 2011).
2.3 Jetico BCWipe
Jetico Inc’s BCWipe, like the products above, can target user-specified files and
directories, or classes of files such as Internet history, swap file, file slack space,
Master File Table (MFT) records and directory entries (Jetco Inc., 2011). In
addition, BCWipe can be installed as part of the Windows Explorer contentsensitive menus.
2.4 Active@ ERASER
Active Data Security Solutions' Active@ ERASER has similar features to the
other test software, including the ability to reside within the Windows Explorer's
menus. Active@ Eraser’s features also include the ability to remove specified
files and folders, as well as Internet and local activity history files created by
several browsers (Active Data Security Solutions, 2011).
2.5 Webroot Window Washer
Webroot Software, Inc.'s Window Washer is a broad-featured application that
claims to "wash" many types of files in order to enhance a user's privacy
protection. In addition to erasing Internet activity (supporting a number of
browsers), wiping files and free space, and "shredding" files and directories,
Window Washer can also clean up files associated with a variety of applications,
such as Microsoft Office, iTunes, Adobe Flash Player, and Adobe Acrobat
(Webroot Software, Inc., 2011).
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3. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
After selecting the five wiping applications described in Section 2, we proceeded
to design and conduct a series of experiments using each application. This section
describes the methodology we used to prepare test data and conduct our
experiments.
Our primary research objectives was to provide information useful for digital
forensics examiners in identifying trace evidence left on suspect media after the
execution of data wiping application software targeting selected data. To that end,
we constructed a pre-experiment, personal computer system that would represent
a consistent starting point prior to conducting our experiments. Using the preexperiment data image as a starting point, we then performed a set of tasks for
each selected data wiping software product. After performing the tasks, we
compared the post-experiment data images to the pre-experiment data image. In
the following sections, we describe our preparation of evaluation data, the
experiments we conducted, and our analysis of the data after conducting the
experiments.
Our secondary objective was to create a framework by which additional wiping
applications could be tested and compared. Because new products are being
introduced into this application space and the versions of existing products change
frequently, we wanted to have a methodology that could be expanded to other,
similar applications.
3.1 Preparation of evaluation data
Prior to conducting the experiments, we established an initial disk drive with
which we could measure the changes caused by running each application. Our
initial configuration consisted of a personal computer workstation in which we
had installed a known set of data files. We installed each data wiping application
onto a separate instance of the known initial configuration.
The workstation used for this study had a single Seagate Barracuda 7200 160 GB
internal hard disk drive as the only storage medium. To ensure that no data
contamination existed on the physical disk drive, we used EnCase Law
Enforcement (v6.11.2.2) to wipe the drive prior to using it. We selected null
characters (i.e., 0x00) to be written to every byte of the physical disk using the
EnCase disk wiping procedure. We verified that the wiping procedure completed
successfully in two ways. First, EnCase provided a dialog box that indicated that
the wiping process completed successfully. Second, we performed a global
regular expression (grep) search for any non-null character on the physical disk
using EnCase, and found none. Subsequently, we created a single 25 GB NTFS
bootable partition on the hard disk drive and installed the Windows 7 operating
system.
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After installing the operating system, we placed sample data onto the disk drive to
provide a basis from which we could evaluate the thoroughness of the selected
wiping tools. Our sample data consisted of 57 data files organized within nine
folders, as listed in Table 3 - Evidence data files. Most of the data files were
downloaded directly from the Internet, including all of the data files stored in the
Desktop, Desktop\images idea, Desktop\ images Italian food, Downloads,
Downloads\Midi, and Downloads\pdf folders. The data files stored in the
Pictures\2011-04020 Building98 folder consisted of still and video images taken
with a Canon PowerShot SD960 camera, transferred directly from the camera’s
Secure Digital (SD) card using Windows Explorer and a Universal Serial Bus
(USB) connection.
Within the Pictures folder, we created four PNG files by using the Print Screen
key to take screen shots, pasting the screen shots into Paint application data files,
and saving them as .png files. This operation also provided data for the Windows
clipboard function whereby we were able to later measure the extent to which the
data wiping tools destroyed this data.
We placed 13 data files within the Desktop\Culinary Documents folder consisting
of Microsoft Word documents, Microsoft Excel spreadsheets, and Portable
Document Format (PDF) files. All of these files were created on another
workstation using MS Office 2007, and subsequently transferred onto the test
system from a USB flash drive. Once these files were placed onto our test system,
we performed some additional tasks on a subset of these files, as described below.
After the Chips.docx file was transferred onto our test system from the flash drive,
we used Microsoft Windows Skydrive document editor to modify the file. We
added one sentence consisting of “I love Hot Cheetos with Limon!” as the first
sentence after the heading at the beginning of the document, and we then
downloaded the modified version of the file back onto the test system replacing
the original version of the file.
Similarly, after we transferred the peanut butter.docx file onto our test system
from the flash drive, we again used Microsoft Windows Skydrive document
editor to modify the file by deleting the last paragraph from the document. After
this deletion, we downloaded the modified version of the file back onto the test
system replacing the original version of the file.
We performed a similar modification using a different editing tool to modify the
Brownies.xls spreadsheet after we transferred the file onto our test system from
the flash drive. For this file, we used Google Docs spreadsheet editor to add the
text “Red Velvet Cake” into the cell in column C, row 9. After adding the text, we
downloaded the modified file back onto the test system replacing the original
version of the file.
The last file we modified within this folder was the Cheesecake.xls spreadsheet.
Again, we used Google Docs spreadsheet editor to modify the file after we had
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transferred it onto our test system. Our modification of this file consisted of
deleting the contents of the cell located at column B, row 3 and three cells from
the F column of the spreadsheet, namely rows 3, 4, and 6. After modifying this
file, we downloaded it back onto our test system replacing the original version of
the file.
The modifications made to the four documents described above provide us with a
sample of files that were originally placed within the folder and subsequently
modified by one of two different editing tools. This provides us with samples
from Microsoft Word documents in versions 2003 and 2007, and Microsoft Excel
spreadsheets. Also, both the Word documents and the Excel spreadsheets include
one file with additions and one file with deletions. Text from the additions and
deletions are included in keyword searches we performed during our analysis of
the post-test data described section 3.3 of this paper.
Table 3 - Evidence data files
Logical path and file name

Physical locaton

C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\
Tiramasu.xlsx
6993864-6993895
Chips.docx
22163504-22163535
Grape Jelly.docx
22163536-22163567
peanut butter.docx
6104032-6104055
Bread.pdf
28562392-28562439
Chips.pdf
21451968-21452023
Grape Jelly.pdf
21418712-21418767
Peanut butter.pdf
21452024-21452063
Brownies.xls
21418768-21418799
Cheesecake.xls
21418856-21418879
Cookies.xls
22044688-22044759
Tirmasu.xls
22045928-22046215
Bread.docx
28562440-28562471
C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images idea\
Light-Bulb-Idea-Hand.jpg
28399184-28399223
gatsby-idea!.jpg
9523776-9523847
light_bulb.png
229728-229759
idea.jpg
20154632-20154743
C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images italian food\
italian-food.jpg
6979096-6979207
italian_food2.jpg
6978368-6978511
italian_food_recession.jpg
4622608-4622903
italian-food-cuisine-pizza.jpg 20864888-20864983
italian-food2.jpg
20718728-20718879
C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\
bbsps.jpg
Firefox Setup 4.0.exe
HazcomManual.doc
Loto.doc
Rubric2009.doc
wrar400.exe

27122824-27122983
20426720-20451295
26836808-26839999
20146400-20147343
6941616-6941815
20778592-20781423

Logical path and file name

Physical locaton

C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Downloads\Midi
Another_One_Bites_the_Dust.mid
Crawling.mid
ISawHerStandingThere.mid

5158080-5158119
5158120-5158191
26783320-26783383

C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Downloads\pdf
Ds_Tetris_Ds.pdf
lindamanual.pdf
mcm996.pdf

20714712-20717727
20782480-20782543
20865208-20865271

C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Downloads
eraser-demo.exe
mseinstall.exe
winzip150.exe
yahoomailuploader.exe

18428288-18432615
19929976-19930943
2919888-2920199
28047064-28047127

C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Pictures\
Search chickenpasta.png
Search applepie images.png
Download idea images.png
Download italian food images.png

20853416-20853695
26650944-26653655
28389000-28391175
20865640-20865783

C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Pictures\2011-04-20 Building98\
Building98 001.MOV
21423544-21423551
Building98 001.THM
28046392-28046399
Building98 002.MOV
21423592-21423599
Building98 002.THM
21447272-21447287
Building98 003.MOV
6942120-6942127
Building98 003.THM
21986256-21986279
Building98 004.JPG
28578376-28578415
Building98 005.JPG
22337800-22338055
Building98 006.JPG
28583240-28584263
Building98 007.JPG
21556472-21557807
Building98 008.JPG
22187512-22194799
Building98 009.JPG
22216120-22223215
Building98 010.JPG
22227384-22231183
Building98 011.JPG
22235320-22239343
Building98 012.JPG
22250808-22255855
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Overall, the sample user data we generated consisted of 57 data files including
Microsoft Word documents, Microsoft Excel spreadsheets, PDF files, executable
program files, and multimedia files representing audio, video, and picture content.
We also included Internet activity, consisting of searches, download history,
browsing data, and activity from three web-based e-mail applications. To provide
additional variety with Internet activity files, we installed Mozilla Firefox in
addition to Microsoft Internet Explorer. Additionally, to represent the actions a
typical user would perform to delete files, we deliberately deleted files using the
Windows 7 GUI to ensure that entries were created in the Windows Recycle Bin
folder. A listing of the data file names is provided in Table 3 - Evidence data files.
Once we completed the installation of the sample user data on the computer
workstation, we performed a static data acquisition of the physical device; with
the computer workstation powered off, we removed the Seagate Barracuda hard
disk drive, attached it to a Tableau Model T5 write blocking device via an IDE
ribbon cable, and connected the write blocking device to our Mac Pro forensic
workstation using a FireWire 800 connection. We used EnCase running under
Windows XP Professional in native mode on a Mac Pro using BootCamp to
perform the data acquisition from the physical device of the Seagate Barracuda
hard disk. We saved the image in an E01 file, and we validated the integrity of the
data acquisition with Message Digest 5 (MD5) and Secure Hash Algorithm
(SHA-1) hash values.
We analyzed the image created from this static data acquisition and identified the
physical sector location of each data file we had stored (Table 3 - Evidence data
files) and used this image as the starting point from which we installed each of the
data wiping products. After installing each data wiping application, we acquired
another image of the physical device. This resulted in six forensic images, one
without any wiping application installed and five consisting of the data contained
on the initial image plus one data wiping application; these latter five images
served as pre-experiment images from which we compared in the post-wipe
analysis.
3.2 Data wiping application tasks
After preparing data images for evaluation, we performed various data wiping
tasks on each pre-experiment image. The tasks targeted specific items on the
volume and are described below:
3.2.1 Active@ Eraser
Upon launching the Active@ Eraser application, we used its GUI to locate and
select each of the files within their respective paths listed in Table 3 - Evidence
data files. We then expanded the Internet & Local Activities option and selected
each of the following items:
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My Internet Auto-Complete (Forms & Passwords)
My Internet Cookies
My Internet History
My Internet Temporary Files
My Recently Used List
My Recycle Bin
My Run History
My Temporary Files

Once all of the files and Internet and local activities had been selected, we clicked
the “Erase” button and employed the “One Pass Zeros (quick, low security)”
option. We unselected the “Verify” option and kept the default option to “Ignore
Errors” (Figure 1 - Screenshot of Active@ ERASER).

Figure 1 - Screenshot of Active@ ERASER

122

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 7(2)
After the process completed successfully, we exited the application and shut
down the personal computer workstation using the standard Windows 7 shutdown
function. We then extracted the hard disk drive and acquired a forensic image of
the entire physical device.
3.2.2 Window Washer
Upon launching the Window Washer application, we clicked on the “Wash
Setup” option and selected the “Custom Wash Items” choice. Within the “Custom
Wash Items” selection, we selected the individual file names and folders indicated
in Table 3 - Evidence data files, and we chose the option to add all of the files in
the preselected file paths. The program indicated that a total of 58 files were
selected for washing.
We chose to accept all of the default options for the other settings. The Internet
items that are selected by default for Internet Explorer are: address bar history,
cookies, temporary Internet files folder (i.e., cache), history (i.e., visited sites),
Index.dat, and Auto-Complete form data. The default setting for the Index.dat file
includes the non-technical user description, “wash with bleach on Windows
startup.”
Similarly, the Internet items that are selected by default for Mozilla Firefox are
Internet cache, cookies, and URL history. Also included by default are Windows
start menu and desktop items, including the Recycle Bin, document history, Run
history, and “find and search history.” Additional Windows system items
included by default include the Windows temp folder and the system temp folder.
Other items selected by default include recent activity (i.e., Most Recently Used,
or MRU) for disk error checking and media player recent file list.
After making the selections indicated above, we selected the “Home” button and
clicked on the button to “Wash My Computer Now.” After the application
completed its tasks, we selected the “Finish” option, exited the application
program, and performed the Windows shutdown process. As above, we then
made a forensic image of the disk drive.
3.2.3 Jetico BCWipe
The BCWipe application was a bit more straight-forward than the two previous
applications; we merely selected the files to be wiped and selected the option to
“delete with wiping.” After the operation completed successfully, we exited the
BCWipe application, and performed the Windows shutdown procedure.
As with the other applications, after the personal computer workstation was
powered off, we imaged the hard drive.
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Figure 2 - Screenshot of Heidi Eraser

3.2.4 Heidi Eraser
Eraser's wipe function is largely controlled via the “Erase Schedule” function;
files to be wiped are selected using the “Add Data” option and “Data to erase” list
(Figure 2 - Screenshot of Heidi Eraser). We verified that the process ran to
completion, exited the Eraser application, shut down the computer, and made a
forensic image of the hard drive.
3.2.5 Evidence Eliminator
Evidence Eliminator required a fair amount of configuration. From the Windows
tab, we selected the “Eliminate Swap File” option, and under the Activity Logs
sub-tab, we selected the options to eliminate Registry Streams (e.g., MRU) and
Windows application logs. Next, we ensured that all of the options were
unchecked under the sub-tab for “Other Areas” and then selected the option to
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eliminate all contents of clipboard memory (Figure 3 - Screenshot of Evidence
Eliminator).
Our next step was to check all three items under the Start tab, namely “Eliminate
‘Run’ history,” “Eliminate ‘Find Computer’ history,” and “Eliminate ‘Find Files’
history.” Similarly, under the Recent Activities tab, we selected the options to
eliminate the recent documents list, start menu order history, and start menu click
history.

Figure 3 - Screenshot of Evidence Eliminator

Evidence Eliminator provided tabs for Internet Explorer and Mozilla Firefox, and
we selected options under each of these categories to remove their respective
components, as indicated below.
To remove evidence concerning Internet Explorer, under the IE tab, we checked
the options to eliminate:
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History of typed URLs in the Internet Explorer address bar
Auto-Complete history of typed form data, URLs and passwords
Download folder memory
Error logs
C:\users\forensics prof\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary
Internet Files\
C:\Windows\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\
Internet Explorer Favorites (URL Bookmarks)
C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Favorites\
C:\Users\Forensics Prof\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\History\

Under the Cookies sub-tab, we selected the option to eliminate cookies in the
C:\Users\Forensics Prof\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Cookies\ folder.
From the Downloaded Components sub-tab, we selected the option to eliminate
components in the C:\Windows\Downloaded Program Files\ folder.
From the Mozilla tab, we selected the following items to wipe:







Cache Folder: C:\Users\Forensics
Prof\AppData\Local\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\dkvfbgyw.default\Cache
Offline Cache: C:\Users\Forensics
Prof\AppData\Local\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\dkvfbgyw.default\OfflineCac
he
History: C:\Users\Forensics
Prof\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\dkvfbgyw.default\places.
sqlite
URL memories in JavaScript prefs file C:\Users\Forensics
Prof\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\dkvfbgyw.default\

Under the Cookies sub-tab for Mozilla, we selected the option to eliminate
Cookies
in
C:\Users\Forensics
Prof\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\dkvfbgyw.default\cookies.sqlite.
From the “More Options” sub-tab, we selected the option to eliminate the
following three items:
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Downloads: C:\Users\Forensics
Prof\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\dkvfbgyw.default\downl
oads.sqlite
Form History: formhistory.sqlite
Session Store sessionstore.js

We then selected the option to eliminate the folder containing Stored Backups for
Mozilla Bookmarks, “Bookmarkbackups.”
We accepted the default settings under the “Mail” tab, and under the “Custom
Files” sub-tab of the “Custom” tab, added the files indicated in Table 3 - Evidence
data files, and selected the option to eliminate all files included in the list. Also,
from the “Custom” tab, we selected the option to eliminate all contents of these
folders, including sub-folder trees.
We selected the recommended option for maximum speed under the Windows
sub-tab of the Mode tab, and we selected the option for extra security to rename
and zero sizes when wiping files. We accepted all of the other default settings,
and we then saved our selected options. Lastly, from the Evidence Eliminator
main window, we selected the “Safe Shutdown” to remove the data and exit the
application.
As with the other scenarios, we verified that the process ran to completion, exited
the application, shut down the computer, and imaged the hard drive.
3.3 Post-wipe analysis
After completing the experiments for each data wiping application, we compared
each post-experiment image against its corresponding pre-experiment image
using a commercially available, validated digital forensics tools, including
Guidance Software’s EnCase Law Enforcement (v 6.11.2.2) and AccessData’s
FTK (v1.81). As we compared each pair of images, we focused on identifying any
persistent markers or trace evidence produced by the wiping process; if present,
these traces have the potential to yield valuable information to a digital forensics
examiner concerning the activities that have occurred on the computer system.
Our procedures to analyze the results of the data wiping experiments involved
seven steps:
1. We located the physical sector of each evidence file in the preexperiment image, as shown in Table 3 - Evidence data files. For each
post-experiment image, we used EnCase to navigate to the physical
sector locations of the selected files to determine the data contents at
the locations.
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2. We generated a list of 99 keywords that were included in the evidence
files and performed a search on the pre-experiment image of these
keywords and on each of the post-experiment images.
3. Based on the pre-experiment image, we created a hash set that included
the MD5 hash values for all 57 evidence files. Using EnCase, we
performed a hash analysis on each of the post-experiment images.
4. Using the pre-experiment image, we performed a search for Internet
history by using the EnCase search function. Similarly, we performed
the same search on each of the post-experiment images.
5. Using the pre-experiment image, we used EnCase to show all of the
contents of the device and sorted the contents by file creation date. We
then performed the same analysis function on each of the postexperiment images. The primary purpose for looking at file creation
date is to identify any items created by the data wiping applications,
such as placeholder files.
6. We used AccessData’s Registry Viewer (v1.5.4.44) to analyze registry
keys contained within the pre-experiment image and each of the postexperiment images. Alghafli, Jones, and Martin (2010) provided
additional reassurance that our registry analysis should focus on eight
different registry folders within the NTUSER.DAT file.
7. We used Regshot (v1.8.2) to analyze changes to the Windows Registry
(Geeknet, Inc., 2009). We used Regshot to take a snapshot of the preexperiment image and each of the post-experiment images, and
compared the differences between the different post-experiment for
each data wiping application.

4. FINDINGS
4.1 Physical sector analysis
Our first step in analyzing each of the data wiping applications was to examine
the physical locations of each of the files listed in Table 3 - Evidence data files on
the post-experiment images to determine if any remnants existed. Four of the five
applications we tested successfully wiped the selected files. Window Washer
deleted the files, but failed to wipe them from the physical location on the disk
drive.
4.2 Keyword search analysis
We performed a keyword search analysis with EnCase using the 99 keywords
described in section 3.3. The raw numbers of keyword search hits for each data
wiping application are provided in Table 4 - Keyword search analysis. Based on
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the keyword search results, Evidence Eliminator was the most thorough at
removing instances of the keywords from the disk image while Window Washer
allowed the largest number of keywords to remain on the disk image. The
majority of items located through the keyword search were from Microsoft Word
(.doc) and Excel (.xls) files found in unallocated clusters within the NTFS volume
of the post-experiment images. Other instances of the keywords were found in the
pagefile and system volume.
Table 4 - Keyword search analysis
Data Wiping Application

Total Number of Keyword Search
Hits

Active@ ERASER

34,768

Heidi Eraser

36,031

Evidence Eliminator

26.748

Jetico BCWipe

36,557

Webroot Window Washer

39,635

4.3 MD5 hash analysis
We performed an MD5 hash analysis using the hash set of the files identified in
Table 3 - Evidence data files; a summary of the results is presented in Table 5 MD5 hash analysis. Again, Window Washer only deleted the files rather than
wiping them; therefore, the hash analysis uncovered all of the evidence files.
Discounting the results from Window Washer, we found two patterns from our
review of the MD5 hash analysis results that we considered noteworthy. With the
exception of the single match from Evidence Eliminator, all of the matches from
the MD5 hash analysis were images, and the majority of those images were
downloaded through Mozilla Firefox.
Table 5 - MD5 hash analysis
Data Wiping Application

Total Number of MD5 Hash Value Hits

Active@ ERASER

12 matches found, all from Mozilla Firefox

Heidi Eraser

11 matches found, most from Mozilla Firefox

Evidence Eliminator

1 match found

Jetico BCWipe

11 matches found, most from Mozilla Firefox

Webroot Window Washer

100% matches found
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4.4 Internet search analysis
We used the comprehensive search function of EnCase to analyze the Internet
history of the post-experiment images for each of the data wiping applications.
We found that each tool produced different results and none of them completely
removed all evidence of Internet activity. We examined the contents of the
Internet history folders associated with Internet Explorer and Firefox using
EnCase to determine whether there was any indication of Internet activity in the
post-wipe images.
Table 6 - Internet search evidence comparison
Prior to
Wiping

Active@
ERASER

Webroot
Window
Washer

Jetico
BCWipe

Heidi
Eraser

Evidence
Eliminator

Completely Erased

N/A

No

No

No

No

No

Bookmarks

78

90

89

101

97

39

Typed URLs

11

12

0

11

11

0

Daily

340

356

360

455

605

188

Weekly

N/A

241

241

134

134

134

Visited Link

633

799

868

820

1031

314

Cache Total

5915

6515

6438

7904

7540

4755

Code

1499

1494

1859

2154

2118

653

Image

3188

3170

3836

4614

4546

1393

HTML

258

256

320

374

368

119

XML

28

28

32

37

35

11

Text

36

35

48

49

48

15

Cookies After

522

223

672

633

633

113

Completely Erased

N/A

No

No

No

No

Yes

Cache Total

1735

1735

61

1751

1749

0

Code

312

312

11

314

313

0

Image

848

848

30

856

862

0

HTML

241

241

6

243

244

0

XML

17

17

0

17

17

0

Text

21

21

0

21

21

0

Browser
Internet Explorer:

Mozilla Firefox:
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We found that that some files and folders were wiped while others were only
deleted from the Master File Table and labeled as unallocated clusters; however,
the contents were still detected by EnCase. Table 6 - Internet search evidence
comparison provides a tabular comparison of the five wiping applications
organized by Internet activity attributes for the two browsers. The values shown
in the table indicate the number of records detected in the corresponding folder for
each browser prior to installing a wiping tool and after using an installed wiping
tool. Notice that the prior-to-wiping values for some measurements, such as
Internet Explorer’s Bookmarks, are smaller than the after-wiping values for
several wiping tools. This is a result of the technique we used to install each of the
wiping tools. The prior-to-wiping measure is based on an image of the data prior
to installing a wiping tool. After this image was created, using restored copies of
the image, we accessed the Internet and used a browser to locate and download
the installation file for each wiping tool. This technique added data to the disk that
was not on the prior-to-wiping image.
4.4.1 Analysis of the Internet Explorer browser
Two of the wiping applications, Window Washer and Evidence Eliminator,
completely removed all entries from the “Typed URL” folder; however, all of the
applications left other relevant data, including the cache, visited history, and
cookies.
BCWipe removed the fewest number of records from the cache, with 7,904
records remaining after its execution. Evidence Eliminator removed the most
records, leaving 4,755 records in the cache folder. Evidence Eliminator also left
the fewest records in the “Visited Link” and “Cookies” folder with 314 and 113
records left, respectively. Heidi Eraser left the most records in the “Visited Link”
folder with 1,031 records remaining. For the “Cookies” folder, Window Washer
left the most records 672. Interestingly, Active@ ERASER somehow increased
the number of records in the bookmarks folder from 86 records prior to execution
to 90 records after execution.
4.4.2. Analysis of the Mozilla Firefox browser
Only Evidence Eliminator removed all detectable Internet history data elements
using EnCase’s Internet history search. All of the other wiping applications left
relevant data in Firefox’s Internet history. Eraser left the most traces of evidence
in the “Cache” folder with 1,749 records left. Window Washer also removed all
of the records from the XML and text folders, and it removed the second largest
number of records from the other Firefox folders (after Evidence Eliminator).
4.5 Analysis of newly created files
We examined each of the post-experiment images to determine the extent with
which any new files were created on the image after the image's data wiping
application was executed. We found that all of the applications we studied created
either log files or placeholder files, and some of them created both. We think
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these findings are significant, as the data created by these applications provide
valuable information that is useful for digital forensics examiners in determining
the extent in which wiping activities were implemented. Specific findings from
each application are provided below.
4.5.1 Files created by Active@ ERASER
Active@ ERASER created two types of files that are noteworthy. The first is an
INI file that details which files the tool attempted to wipe (Figure 4 - Active@
Eraser INI File). The second type of file is a placeholder file with a .tmp
extension. These .tmp files were created by Active@ ERASER to replace the files
that were wiped and located under the same file paths of the original files. Two
examples of the placeholder files are provided in Figure 5 - Placeholder files
created by Active@ ERASER.

Last Accessed
File Created
Last Written
Physical Size
Physical Location
Hash Value
Full Path

04/25/11 04:21:52PM
04/25/11 04:21:52PM
04/25/11 08:56:09PM
4,096
106,270,720
8ef4b1ad9fb88d7f2252d32ec3be5a09
SPS2011 WT1b\Wiping Tool 1b\D\Program Files\Active Data Security Solutions
\Active Eraser Demo\EraserD.ini

[GeneralSettings]
StartupRun=1
RunMinimized=0
ConfirmManualErase=1
ConfirmScheduleErase=0
ErasingMethod=2
KeyExit=88
KeyCleanup=67
KeySetting=83
[StartPlacement]
Width=785
Height=560
TreeRight=250
[ScheduleSettings]
StartOptions=0
[CheckedFiles]
0=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Pictures\2011-04-20 Building98
1=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Pictures\Search chickenpasta.png
2=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Pictures\Search applepie images.png
3=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Pictures\Download italian food images.png
4=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Pictures\Download idea images.png
5=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images italian food\italian_food_recession.jpg
6=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images italian food\italian_food2.jpg
7=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images italian food\italian-food2.jpg
8=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images italian food\italian-food.jpg
9=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images italian food\italian-food-cuisine-pizza.jpg
10=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images idea\light_bulb.png
11=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images idea\Light-Bulb-Idea-Hand.jpg
12=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images idea\idea.jpg
13=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images idea\gatsby-idea!.jpg
14=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Downloads\pdf
15=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Downloads\midi
16=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents
17=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Downloads\yahoomailuploader_0.5.exe

Figure 4 - Active@ Eraser INI File
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4.5.2 Files created by Window Washer
During our analysis of the Window Washer post-experiment image, we identified
a log file named Custom.mst that was created by the application. This log file
provides details of the files selected for wiping (Figure 6 - Log File Created by
Window Washer).

Name
Z8518.tmp
Signature
Match
Last Accessed 04/19/11 12:36:18PM
File Created
04/25/11 08:53:11PM
Last Written
04/25/11 08:53:11PM
Physical Location
10,458,480,640
Physical Sector
20,426,720
Hash Value
52ed7cd2a664bc45274e8e1eded33718
Full Path
SPS2011 WT1b\Wiping Tool 1b\D\Users\Forensics
Prof\Desktop\Z8518.tmp
Name
Z85C6.tmp
Signature
Match
Last Accessed 04/19/11 12:58:57PM
File Created
04/25/11 08:53:11PM
Last Written
04/25/11 08:53:11PM
Physical Location
13,886,885,888
Physical Sector
27,122,824
Hash Value
249e1be6d20f3da440dc421b69ff5a64
Full Path
SPS2011 WT1b\Wiping Tool 1b\D\Users\Forensics
Prof\Desktop\Z85C6.tmp

Figure 5 - Placeholder files created by Active@ ERASER

4.5.3 Files created by BCWipe
From our analysis of the BCWipe post-experiment image, we found that this
application also creates placeholder files within their respective folders to replace
the files that were wiped. The majority of the filenames of the placeholder files
appear to be random characters, and some of them include file extensions. Table 7
- BCWipe Placeholder files contains a listing of the placeholder files names
within their respective folders.
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4.5.4 Files created by Eraser
Our analysis of the Eraser post-experiment image yielded only one relevant file
that was created after running the application, namely a log file named Task
List.esrx. This log files appears to contain much metadata; however, for
formatting purposes, we are omitting a copy of it from this paper due to its length
and extensive quantity non-printable characters. However, it seems likely that
additional, valuable content might be available if one were to become aware of
the formatting structure of this log file, as many of the unprintable characters may
contain important metadata, such as dates and time or binary values.

Name
File Ext
Signature
File Created
Last Accessed
Last Written
Entry Modified
Physical Location
Physical Sector
Hash Value
Full Path

Custom.mst
mst
Unknown
04/26/11 02:03:03PM
04/26/11 02:03:03PM
04/26/11 02:03:03PM
04/26/11 02:03:03PM
1,015,377,920
1,983,160
584237ae2bb271be9e5e96eee0dcf0e0
WPT2b\Window Washer\D\Users\ForensicsProf\AppData\Roaming\Webroot
\Washer\Plugins\Custom.mst

[Desktop]
FileCount=58
File00=C:\Users\Forensics
File01=C:\Users\Forensics
File02=C:\Users\Forensics
File03=C:\Users\Forensics
File04=C:\Users\Forensics
File05=C:\Users\Forensics
File06=C:\Users\Forensics
File07=C:\Users\Forensics
File08=C:\Users\Forensics
File09=C:\Users\Forensics
File10=C:\Users\Forensics
File11=C:\Users\Forensics
File12=C:\Users\Forensics
File13=C:\Users\Forensics
File14=C:\Users\Forensics
File15=C:\Users\Forensics
File16=C:\Users\Forensics
File17=C:\Users\Forensics
File18=C:\Users\Forensics
File19=C:\Users\Forensics
File20=C:\Users\Forensics
File21=C:\Users\Forensics
File22=C:\Users\Forensics
File23=C:\Users\Forensics
File24=C:\Users\Forensics
File25=C:\Users\Forensics
File26=C:\Users\Forensics

Prof\Desktop\bbsps.jpg
Prof\Desktop\Downloads.lnk
Prof\Desktop\Firefox Setup 4.0.exe
Prof\Desktop\HazcomManual.doc
Prof\Desktop\Loto.doc
Prof\Desktop\rubric2009.doc
Prof\Desktop\wrar400.exe
Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\Bread.docx
Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\Bread.pdf
Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\Brownies.xls
Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\Cheesecake.xls
Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\Chips.docx
Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\Chips.pdf
Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\Cookies.xls
Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\Grape Jelly.docx
Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\Grape Jelly.pdf
Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\peanut butter.docx
Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\peanut butter.pdf
Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\Tiramasu.xls
Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\Tiramasu.xlsx
Prof\Desktop\images idea\gatsby-idea!.jpg
Prof\Desktop\images idea\idea.jpg
Prof\Desktop\images idea\light_bulb.png
Prof\Desktop\images idea\Light-Bulb-Idea-Hand.jpg
Prof\Desktop\images italian food\italian_food_recession.jpg
Prof\Desktop\images italian food\italian_food2.jpg
Prof\Desktop\images italian food\italian-food.jpg

Figure 6 - Log File Created by Window Washer
4.5.5 Files created by Evidence Eliminator
As in our analysis of the Eraser post-experiment image, we found that the
Evidence Eliminator post-experiment image contained only one newly created
file of significant value, and it, too, was a log file. The Evidence Eliminator log
file is named Files.dat and it lists the pathnames of files wiped by the application.
The metadata associated with this log file and its visual contents are shown in
Figure 7 - Evidence Eliminator log file.
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Table 7 - BCWipe Placeholder files
\Users\Forensics
Prof\Downloads\
moiodwblfgrrvee
swsiraumlbmkveqamtejxccx
pwsqswva.wey
ohceabbdgtnuequybbnepvwotjq
veu
lyxlvckrsnybr
vacjbeidbbisdp
qggkugyl.gmu
rfrsprfdyvnovctm
rfrsprfdyvnovctm
desktop.ini
pdf
midi
\Users\Forensics Prof\Pictures\
pikbamjhkbtxwulahv
eymerktseesfjycwdd
jnvarjoegbprhuotrl
dwapvgpwbnprouranv
oedbbbpmvqxwbajldn
ufmvpgwmfklqkilbcu
maamiufhrnomehrlha
hcwhoqhpyndlyvqfaj
tramtucnfiyxjwbhov
kfvpbpibhekldukfgbvnelljxacaq
nkv
wqmxbkrmmmvobiqnlv
dlbkuoqsmoffpwyhpn
inqfjfhqoivsexcpgc
ntpureeuykmnkukbgf
fgkumsxeqmkaunnibhsenqme
rujsqrklixgdfgwtnbiwaix
dkqvodvehoeyjqcujrmbwudcmv

\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\
xviiijsnertmaf
ffcnwfqquketc
twgkthep.owl
oecjpxuajpbuexbj
ldwaskdaiqofxsnrwt
ufngsqha.hmr
iexiyvlm.fqa
ycfdkmcbdhaiaev
fhthkuxdrwcleucqs
bijmfhau.urn
yackamehuvmnir
lxxxojhu.jew
hjkoyytm.dyj
cudyehux.smb
wwvcuqkoiicplg
ohceabbdgtnuequybboepvwo
jjrutfhrhlyrfaxb
bhkwfcuo.xpk
astyclxp.dwr
qgmmiqsotndovvokgjxmjmgtrpfmyxnlmuw
fykcusali
kbkdyidlcvibbxuy
pftjrgprdprgmehe
pgcjyjlrwhwkmhpov
hcbvomvrndmbjeiewxtpbqlwno
rkuappyibbfpekvuiohnwqrrkhksnc
yuxrmnovlmgmneqcc
kbcmishjtifmtnlcnohxdxbxqn
klywbver.jwo
jtsmjnniyfxbfhknmrsem
idgqtemk.kif
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Comment
Name
Signature
File Created
Last Accessed
Last Written
Entry Modified
Physical Location
Physical Sector
Hash Value
Full Path

Evidence Eliminator Log.
Files.dat
! Bad signature
05/02/11 04:48:22PM
05/02/11 04:48:22PM
05/03/11 02:08:10PM
05/03/11 02:08:10PM
2,385,395,712
4,658,976
37b663d1364ee98a32b8f6cd8da8bb02
WT5b\SPS2011WT5b\D\Program Files\Evidence Eliminator\Data\Files.dat

C:\Users\Forensics
C:\Users\Forensics
C:\Users\Forensics
C:\Users\Forensics
C:\Users\Forensics
C:\Users\Forensics
C:\Users\Forensics
C:\Users\Forensics
C:\Users\Forensics
C:\Users\Forensics
C:\Users\Forensics
C:\Users\Forensics
C:\Users\Forensics
C:\Users\Forensics

Prof\Desktop\bbsps.jpg
Prof\Desktop\downloads.lnk
Prof\Desktop\Firefox Setup 4.0.exe
Prof\Desktop\HazcomManual.doc
Prof\Desktop\Loto.doc
Prof\Desktop\Rubric2009.doc
Prof\Desktop\wrar400.exe
Prof\Downloads\mseinstall.exe
Prof\Downloads\winzip150.exe
Prof\Downloads\yahoomailuploader.exe
Prof\Pictures\Download idea images.png
Prof\Pictures\Download italian food images.png
Prof\Pictures\Search applepie images.png
Prof\Pictures\Search chickenpasta.png

Figure 7 - Evidence Eliminator log file

4.6 Windows registry analysis
Our Windows registry analysis is the first of two methods we used to review the
contents of Windows registry data. In this first method, we used AccessData’s
Registry Viewer to search the contents within the post-experiment images for
each of the data wiping applications we studied.
Our Windows registry analysis focused on the NTUSER.DAT registry file (i.e.,
hive) and we evaluated the values for several subdirectories (i.e., keys). The paths
we analyzed are listed in

Table 8 - NTUSER.DAT subdirectory analysis.
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Table 8 - NTUSER.DAT subdirectory analysis
NTUSER.DAT>Software>Mi
crosoft>

Internet
Explorer>TypedURLs

NTUSER.DAT>Software>Mi
crosoft>

IAM

NTUSER.DAT>Software>Mi
crosoft>

Windows>CurrentVersion>E
xplorer>

RecentDo
cs

NTUSER.DAT>Software>Mi
crosoft>

Windows>CurrentVersion>E
xplorer>

RunMRU

NTUSER.DAT>Software>Mi
crosoft>

Windows>CurrentVersion>E
xplorer>

ComDlg3
2>

LastVisitedPidl
MRU

NTUSER.DAT>Software>Mi
crosoft>

Windows>CurrentVersion>E
xplorer>

ComDlg3
2>

OpenSavePidlM
RU

NTUSER.DAT>Software>Mi
crosoft>

Windows>CurrentVersion>E
xplorer>

ComDlg3
2>

FirstFolder

NTUSER.DAT>Software>Mi
crosoft>

Windows>CurrentVersion>E
xplorer>

ComDlg3
2>

CIDSizeMRU

In analyzing these NTUSER.DAT subdirectories, we examined the postexperiment images of each wiping application. As we located traces of evidence
pertaining to the files we had planted for wiping or any evidence indicating that a
data wiping application had run, we then tracked these findings using the
bookmarking feature within Registry Viewer. These bookmarks were
subsequently included in reports we generated from Registry Viewer.
Three of the five wiping applications did not remove items from the
NTUSER.DAT subdirectories. Using AccessData’s Registry Viewer, we found
entries for typed URLs, Internet accounts, recent documents, and recently used
programs in the post-experiment images for Active@ ERASER, BCWipe, and
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Eraser. Evidence Eliminator and Window Washer did remove data from their
respective NTUSER.DAT files with different levels of completeness.
Window Washer removed the typed URLs and a portion of the data regarding
recent documents. However, evidence remained that revealed the names of the
most recently run programs, Internet accounts, and partial information concerning
recent documents.
Of the five applications we analyzed, Evidence Eliminator performed the most
thorough cleansing of the NTUSER.DAT data. Evidence Eliminator removed the
entries in the typed URLs and recent documents subdirectories; however, Internet
accounts remained in the NTUSER.DAT file, and additional data were present that
indicated that the Evidence Eliminator application had been recently used.
All of the applications we analyzed left trace evidence in the NTUSER.DAT file.
While some of the applications were more successful at removing evidence of
previous activity than others, enough data remained to provide valuable
information. Based on these findings, we suggest that forensics examiners
routinely examine the NTUSER.DAT file, especially in cases where there is
concern regarding the use of data wiping.
4.7 Regshot analysis
We used the Regshot utility to capture and compare a snapshot of the Windows
Registry for the pre-experiment image and each of the post-experiment images. A
summary of the changes in registry entries is provided in Table 9 - Regshot
comparison summary. This table indicates the number of keys deleted or added
from the execution of each data wiping application, as well as, additions,
deletions, or modifications of values within the registry. The volume of data
provided within the registry snapshots overwhelmed our current personnel
resources for analysis; therefore, we were not able to fully examine the extent to
which all of the registry entries were impacted by the execution of the data wiping
tools. We did find sufficient evidence to justify continuing this evaluation in
future studies, and we encourage other researchers to consider this topic.

Table 9 - Regshot comparison summary
Active@
ERASER

Window
Washer

Jetico
BCWipe

Heidi
Eraser

Evidence
Eliminator

Keys Deleted

31

50,960

705

59,811

60,916

Keys Added

38

828

3,135

166

3,253

Values Deleted

63

156,161

1,428

207,899

213,523
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Values Added

108

2,855

8,786

1,053

9,908

Values Modified

353

2,316

2,075

429

3,286

Total Changes

593

213,120

16,129

269,358

290,886

5. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
While the five data wiping applications we analyzed provide utilities for users to
destroy data, we found that all of them leave some trace artifacts that may be
valuable to digital forensics examiners. We found that all of the applications
created log or other files that detailed their activity and all neglected to remove all
relevant data within the Windows 7 Registry. Additionally, these applications left
data regarding the usage of the Internet Explorer browser, and all but one of them
left data regarding the Firefox browser.
Based on our analysis of these five applications, we suggest that digital forensics
examiners routinely analyze the Windows Registry in situations where the
examiner is concerned about the use of data wiping applications. For many years
we have considered Windows Registry analysis to be among the activities
performed during a thorough digital forensic analysis of a Windows-based
workstation or server, and we do not think that the specific tasks identified within
this paper significantly complicates or prolongs the digital forensic analysis
procedure. In our opinions, the potential benefits derived from finding evidence
resulting from the Windows Registry analysis outweigh the costs associated with
performing the minor additional procedures.
We have also considered the long-term impact of these findings on digital
forensic analysis. As this information regarding trace evidence from targetspecific data wiping software applications become more disseminated, it is likely
that software developers will modify their applications to reduce the amount of
trace evidence left after its execution, and the more technically informed users of
target-specific data wiping software applications will likely take additional steps
to more thoroughly conceal their activities. As a result of these likely future
changes, we anticipate that the amount of trace evidence recovered from
Windows Registry analysis will decline; however, for the foreseeable future, we
consider an analysis of the Windows Registry to be an essential part of a thorough
digital forensic analysis of a Windows-based workstation or server.
6. LIMITATIONS
In this study, we analyzed only five data wiping applications that function on
Windows 7 based systems. While our methodology of performing measured
experiments based on identical data supports generalization, our small sample size
does impose significant statistical limitations that make us reluctant to generalize
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these findings. Our limited resources, particularly temporal constraints, prohibited
us from thoroughly analyzing the extent to which all Windows Registry keys
were modified from the data we collected in our Regshot analysis. Nonetheless,
the results we obtained are applicable for the experimental conditions, and the
methodology that we outlined here was successful in defining a process and
procedure with which to carry out additional experiments in more detail and with
a broader suite of applications.
We recognize that there are instances whereby users have legitimate reasons for
using target-specific data wiping application software. It would be beneficial to
provide data concealment information for uses in these instances; however, our
focus during this study was directed at a scenario in which a forensic examiner is
tasked to recover evidence from a Windows 7 workstation where the user utilized
target-specific application software to conceal data or activities. Based on our
research focus, we address the forensic examiner’s role of identifying trace
evidence without regard to normative values.
A potential counterproductive artifact from this study is that the authors of data
removal applications may become more aware of the trace evidence that we have
exposed and modify their applications to nullify our findings, thus raising the antiforensics bar. That is, of course, a downside to any research in this space, as those
who hide evidence can often stay ahead of those who are tasked with finding it.
Nevertheless, the mere existence of wiping software that is "examination-proof"
does not mean that users will properly employ it and, therefore, research in this
area can still be used to inform the digital forensics community.
7. CALL FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH
A more thorough analysis of the Windows Registry modifications might prove to
be valuable. Additional research from a larger, scientific sample of data wiping
applications might lead to a better understanding of this area, so that
generalizations can be recognized.
In addition, as data wiping becomes more commonly available, even built in with
operating systems and user applications, computer forensics examiners need to
have a more defined approach to detecting when wiping programs have been used
and the mechanism employed. To that end, we need to have testing methods in
place as new operating systems, applications, and versions of applications become
available. Test beds to help detect wiping signatures, including remnants in the
registry and other log files, will greatly enhance our ability for this very detection.
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